Supervisión del consejo de administración y estructura de propiedad como determinantes de la retribución de la alta dirección

María Encarnación Lucas Pérez, Juan Samuel Baixauli Soler

Resumen


RESUMEN: Este trabajo analiza el papel que desempeña el consejo de administración y la estructura de propiedad sobre la supervisión y determinación del sistema retributivo de los altos directivos. El análisis se realiza para el conjunto de empresas españolas que cotizan en el mercado bursátil durante el periodo 2004-2010. Los resultados muestran que el paquete retributivo de los altos directivos se caracteriza por un escaso peso de la parte variable y por un bajo empleo de las opciones sobre acciones. Asimismo, se evidencia que las características de los consejos de administración no ejercen una influencia significativa en la retribución vinculada a resultados, siendo el tipo de propietario mayoritario quien determina la eficacia supervisora del consejo sobre el diseño retributivo.

ABSTRACT: This paper examines the role of board of directors and ownership structure on the effectiveness of executive pay design. An analysis performed on the whole Spanish listed firms in the period 2004-2010 showed that executive pay is characterized by a low variable compensation proportion –both bonus and stock options- as well as by the lack of connection with firm performance. Also, results evidence that boards’ monitoring do not exert significant influence on variable compensation, being the type of majority owner, through the board, who mainly determine executive pay effectiveness.


Palabras clave


Retribución de los altos directivos, gobierno corporativo, consejo de administración, estructura de propiedad

Citas


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